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Brazil’s Soft Approach to Regional Governance

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Abstract

Brazil’s home region has two peculiarities: first, it is essentially fuzzy as its extension and membership have changed overtime; second, regardless of its limits, its inner core has been characterized by a long period of interstate peace. These factors have led to two outcomes: first, high politics has been conducted through diplomatic rather than military means; second, region-building has remained under the strictest control of the governments rather than becoming self-sustaining. Regional public goods have been mostly defined on the negative, especially as the avoidance of negative externalities, and only recently has Brazil started to invest in the creation of a governance framework that keep extra-regional powers away. Yet, structural limitations and instrumental constraints have limited Brazilian efforts and turned South America into a still peaceful but increasingly divergent sub-region. Through an analysis of institutional overlap and policy networks, especially regarding nuclear energy and the environment, this paper shows that Brazil’s low, late and soft investment in regional security governance is explained by a combination of low regional risks, scarce domestic resources, a legalistic culture of dispute settlement, and transgovernmental networks that substitute for intense interstate cooperation and deep regional institutions.

Keywords

Regional security governance, regional powers, policy networks, South America, Brazil.
Introduction*

Neither is South America a typical regional security complex nor is Brazil a typical rising power. Whereas South America has been a zone of peace or at least a no war zone for the last 70 years, Brazil has managed its ongoing rise without frightening its neighbors or heavily arming itself. These facts are interconnected: South America is a peaceful region partly because Brazil behaves peacefully, and Brazil is peaceful because it is surrounded by no enemies. This chapter analyzes the security dynamics developed between Brazil and its neighbors, both at the state and non-state levels, in order to explain the unique features of South American security architecture.

Brazil’s home region has two peculiarities: first, it is constitutively fuzzy; second, its inner core has been characterized by a long period of interstate peace. The way Brazil defines the region is fuzzy since it has first encompassed all of the Western Hemisphere, then Latin America, and today just the South American subcontinent according to how Brazil’s interests were defined in a given historical period (Malamud and Gardini 2012; Spektor 2010). More significantly, its inner core – i.e. South America – has been peaceful given the absence of interstate war between major powers since 1883, and altogether since 1942 (Kacowicz 2005; Mares 2001). These factors have led to two outcomes: first, high politics has been conducted through diplomatic rather than military means; second, region-building has remained as an instrument at the service of national strategies rather than a regional goal per se, as no immanent region exists.

Given a historical low level of intra-regional exchanges, regional public goods have been usually defined on the negative, mostly as the avoidance of harmful externalities. No country in the region has been capable of either forcing or buying off its neighbors alone, so potential hegemons have traditionally been located outside. The correlation of forces among the major powers, principally Argentina and Brazil, was equilibrated until the 1980s, and mutual distrust as much as the scarcity of extra-regional threats prevented them from building a joint security architecture. However, the balance of power had already started to tilt towards Brazil, and by 2000s it became evident that bipolarity was no longer an apt description of the regional state of affairs (Schenoni 2012). Only then did Brazil start to invest in the creation of a governance framework to stabilize the region and keep extra-regional powers away. Yet, structural limitations and instrumental constraints have limited its efforts and turned South America into a still peaceful but increasingly divergent sub-region.

To analyze the tension between the buildup of governance structures and the mounting foreign policy divergences, the remaining of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first introduces the region and depicts risks and threats as perceived by Brazil’s government and foreign policy elites. The second delves into the sources of Brazil’s foreign power, showing that domestic constraints impose a high toll on its capacity to act abroad. The third analyzes Brazilian foreign strategies, regional institution-building and policy networks in the areas of nuclear energy and the environment to pinpoint Brazil’s role in the developing of security governance. The fourth assesses the results and impact of security governance policies, demonstrating that current achievements are rooted in historic traditions. The last section sums up, arguing that Brazil’s low, late and soft investment in regional security governance can be explained by a combination of low regional risks, scarce resources, a legalistic culture of dispute settlement, and transgovernmental networks that substitute for, or subtly underpin, interstate cooperation and regional institutions.

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1 The 1995 conflict between Ecuador and Peru stands as a plausible exception (Mares and Palmer 2012).
Brazil’s Perceptions of Security Risks and Threats in the Region

Along its main official documents, Brazil defines itself as a “peaceful country” and asserts that the peaceful resolution of conflicts is an essential component of its foreign policy (Brasil 2008; Brasil 2012). However, the country has not always been reluctant to the use of force. In the nineteenth century, it conquered vast territories and engaged in two major wars, first against Argentina over what is now Uruguay and then, jointly with Argentina and Uruguay, against Paraguay. In the twentieth century, it made peace within the region only to become the single Latin American country to take part in both World Wars, always alongside the US. The fact that Argentina only battled Great Britain in the twentieth century means that the two main South American powers have not been engaged in a regional war for the last 140 years, and have not fought each other for more than 180 years. The pacification of Brazil’s relations with the neighborhood was a consequence of having demarcated all its borders at the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore no longer making or receiving territorial claims. A satisfied country facing no irredentist threats, it could afford to build a security tradition based on the absence of strategic enemies. Brazil’s commitment to non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries was born out of its security perceptions in this context (Proença Jr and Diniz 2009). However, the regional scenario was far from idyllic.

Until 1979, Argentina was seen as a major security threat, and the possibility of a military confrontation with it shaped the mission of the Brazilian armed forces. This perception began to change when both countries, under symmetric military rule, signed an agreement on the shared Paraná river basin (Resende-Santos 2002). The following democratic regimes deepened this cooperation path by signing several agreements covering from nuclear to trade issues. In 1991, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) was established, and the historic rivalry between Argentina and Brazil was turned into full-fledged regional cooperation. As Argentina ceased to represent a threat, the Amazonian region began to be identified as the main security concern. Following several publications issued by military agencies, a new approach became official in 1996 with the publication of the National Defense Policy (Battaglino 2013). The mission assigned to the Brazilian military was based on a scenario of asymmetric resistance against an extra-regional power intervention in the Amazon, as expressed in the 2005 update of the National Defense Policy and in the National Defense Strategy, issued in 2008. Extra-regional powers are never named but off-the-record statements point to the US as greatest source of concern. The national strategy focuses on the Amazon as well as on the so-called Blue Amazon, Brazil’s immense sea shelf and its oil reserves whose recent discovery has influenced the country’s strategic orientation. This involves not only the army but also the navy and air force, who should have conventional capabilities to deny hostile forces the use of the sea and to secure local air superiority (Brasil 2008). Two goals are constant throughout all official documents: keeping the equilibrium between the three forces and fostering the modernization of the military arsenal, often with an eye on the development of indigenous technology.

The absence of enemies in the neighborhood, together with the nonexistence of nuclear powers, have crystallized into a relatively secure environment in which transnational crime is sometimes more pressing than strategic threats. Indeed, trans-border issues such as drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling are increasingly sensitive. Other non-military troubles have sporadically emerged in the neighborhood, such as the negative externalities of domestic instability in contiguous states or the unfriendly nationalization of Brazilian state utilities. The White Book on National Defense, issued for the first time in 2012, reflects the country’s overlapping defense, security and development concerns (Brasil 2012). A significant factor behind this amalgamation is the ideology of the ruling Workers’ Party, which benefited from low levels of threat perception to promote the inclusion of the defense area into a national development strategy.

The amalgamation of sectoral interests and policy areas has blurred the priorities of the defense agenda. Hence, the White Book lists four key areas: the (Green) Amazon, the Blue Amazon, the South Atlantic Ocean, and the west shore of Africa. Besides the precedence of responsibility over differentiated geographic areas, each military force has been assigned functional responsibilities: the
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Air Force is in charge of air control over Green Amazon and space projects; the Army is responsible for border control and localized intervention in the hinterlands, as well as cyberspace; and the Navy remains in command of Blue Amazon and its pre-salt resources, but also of the country’s nuclear development including its crown jewel, the projected nuclear-powered submarine. As it turns out, organizational politics and developmentalist goals have influenced defense planning no less than strategic priorities.

Besides development, another constant in Brazil’s foreign policy has been the quest for autonomy, whose contours have adapted to changing times. While the country’s stance during the Cold War was labeled as “autonomy through distance” vis-à-vis foreign powers and regional rivals, in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall the country’s diplomacy promoted “autonomy through participation” in international institutions and regional organizations (Fonseca Jr. 2004). When Lula came to power in 2003, Brazil’s foreign policy acquired a moderately revisionist tone that was dubbed “autonomy through diversification” of partners and arenas (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). “Autonomy through distance” was the diplomatic expression of Brazil’s developmentalism, under which the country accepted the demand for alignment with the US while trying to use it as bargaining chip for economic advantages. Likewise, “autonomy through participation” implied the adherence to international regimes in order to leverage, not impair, the country’s foreign policy leeway. “Autonomy through diversification” sought the adherence to international norms by means of South-South and regional alliances in order to reduce asymmetries with the developed countries, thus always wedging the quest for autonomy with the goal of development. Unlike most other world regions, security issues were downplayed or combined with other priorities. This calls for attention to context and history, as “where wars have been rare, power may have a softer meaning than elsewhere, and policy options may thus be framed differently” (Malamud 2011: 4). As Hurrell argues (1998: 260), South America “provides important grounds for doubting that regional ‘anarchies’ are everywhere alike.”

In the current Brazilian view, South America is not just a geographical region (different from Latin America as a whole) but also an autonomous political-economic area, given that U.S. influence recedes as distance from Washington increases. Brazil’s elites consider this subregion to be within the country’s natural sphere of influence (CEBRI-CINDES 2007; Souza 2008), although this perception has slightly changed its value load in the last years as the region is increasingly regarded as a burden rather than an asset (Malamud 2011).

Following Merke (2011: 23), Latin America can be characterized by certain facts that are accentuated in South America. First, in two hundred years no state has disappeared and only one has been born. Second, the principle of Uti Possidetis (as you possess, you may possess) was agreed on even before the independence from Portugal and Spain and allowed state borders to be delimited much more peacefully than in Europe. Third, Latin America is the world region that contains most bilateral and multilateral agreements related to the peaceful settlement of conflicts (Holsti 1996; Kacowicz 2005), as well as the “world record of adjudication and arbitration” (Kacowicz 2004: 199). International comparison is stunning: while “there have been some twenty-two instances of legally binding third-party arbitrations or adjudications with respect to sovereignty over territory in Latin America…, similar rulings apply to only one small case in continental Europe…; two among independent states in Africa; two in the Middle East; and three in Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific” (Simmons 1999: 6-7). Fourth, as mentioned, Latin America is a nuclear-weapon free zone. In summary, state survival has been virtually guaranteed, wars have been rare, and legalization of disputes has been the norm. This does not mean that political violence has been eradicated, but either “there has been a limited conception of force within a strong diplomatic culture” (Hurrell, 1998: 532; Mares 2001) or it has been confined within – as opposed to across – borders (Martin 2006). Therefore, security has acquired a rather domestic than international connotation. Brazil is a product of this historical and geographical environment, and as such it carries more resemblances to its neighbors than to either the traditional European states or the new emerging powers.
Sources of Power

Social power, or the capacity to make others do something they would not otherwise, rests on three types of resource: coercive or political, material or economic, and persuasive or ideological-normative (Poggi 1990). In international relations, the first two are often paired, giving rise to a twofold classification: “hard power” is based on the utilization of structural (i.e. military or economic) means to influence the behavior or interests of others, while “soft power” refers to the ability to achieve one’s goals through co-optation and attraction rather than coercion or payment (Nye 1990). Ideas, institutions, and exemplary behavior or performance are the main instruments of the latter kind of power. As impressive as Brazil may look to the untrained eye, its hard power is often overestimated and most of its international achievements are based on the soft power deployed by its resourceful diplomacy (Burges 2008).

Despite its vast territory, relatively large armed forces and considerable defense budget, which is the highest in Latin America (Figure 1), Brazil is not – and has no intention of becoming – a military power. Instead, it sees itself as a peace-loving, law-abiding, and benign power (Lafer 2001; Brasil 2008), and in the global scale it is a military lightweight. Brazil does neither have nor, according to its Constitution, is allowed to have, nuclear weapons, which sets it apart from both the established and emerging powers. In spite of being the fifth country in the world by area and population and the seventh by economic size, it is not ranked among the top-10 states whether regarding military personnel, military expenditure, arms exports or imports, or participation in peace operations (SIPRI 2012). Moreover, when measured as a proportion of GDP, its military spending is considerably lower than other South American states such as Chile and Colombia (Figure 2). This figure is even less impressive when considering that 83% of the military budget is spent on salaries and pensions (FIESP 2011).

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1**

**Military expenditure in current dollars, selected South American countries, 1991-2012**

Source: own elaboration from data of SIPRI 2013.
Brazil also lacks the economic leverage to buy its way into regional or global leadership. Economic growth has been low and inconsistent even during the last much-praised decade (Figure 3), and it ranks at the bottom amongst the emerging markets. Participation in global trade is much smaller than the country’s world share of GDP: it stands slightly over 1% vis-à-vis 3%, a figure lower than fifty years ago that puts the country at 22nd in world rankings (WTO 2012). Physical infrastructure is scant and aging (The Economist 2013), risking to become a bottleneck for development and a drainage of national resources. Furthermore, the country’s position in education, innovation and competitiveness rankings is gloomy. This has raised recurring fears of “the curse of the hen’s flight,” which describes “the centuries-old succession of brief periods of strong economic growth followed by phases of stagnation and depression” (Valladão 2013: 89).
Absolute economic shortcomings are compounded by relative regional standings. Unlike Germany’s position in Europe, Brazil is the largest Latin American economy but not the richest. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay rank consistently higher in terms of GDP per capita and human development, and Mexico and Venezuela do so intermittently depending on oil prices. As a consequence, Brazilian politicians have found extremely hard to sell domestically the importance of money transfers to neighboring countries, as this would entail sacrificing poor Brazilians to the benefit of wealthier foreigners.

Given the shortage of hard power resources, Brazil is one of the few emerging countries to have staked its future on soft power (Burges 2008; Sotero and Armijo 2007). This is based primarily on diplomacy, on the wise use of its cultural charm, and on its growing role as a facilitator and cooperation supplier. Successive administrations have put diplomacy to profitable use, managing to translate scale into influence. They have sat Brazil at every negotiation table to address issues as diverse as climate change, world trade, nonproliferation or cooperation for development. In the region, Brazilian envoys have often mediated in third party conflicts with the least intrusive means available. As is proudly said in Itamaraty, the foreign ministry palace, Brazil has a “diplomatic GDP” that exceeds its economic one: in other words, it can punch above its weight because of the high quality of its professional diplomacy. To be sure, presidential diplomacy has also been decisive in fostering the country’s international reputation (Malamud 2005; Cason and Power 2009).

Security Governance Policies

Regional security governance, meaning region-based regulations of security issues, performs two functions – institution-building and conflict resolution – and employs two sets of instruments – the persuasive (political and diplomatic) and the coercive (military interventions and internal policing), with economic means alternating between them. The combination of these dimensions produces a four-fold typology: assurance, prevention, protection and compellence (Kirchner and Sperling 2007).
Assurance: Promotion of democracy and regional integration

Assurance policies identify the efforts aimed at post-conflict reconstruction and confidence building measures. Given that South America has not featured destructive conflicts or wars, re-construction solidarity has been limited to cooperation after natural catastrophes and is not related to security issues. In contrast, democracy promotion and regional integration rank atop collective endeavors – though with several caveats.

Historically, there have been two major institutional mechanisms to resolve inter-state security disputes in the region, both of which include non-Latin American countries. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), signed in the city of Rio in 1947, commits signatories to mutual defense in case of an outside attack. The Organization of American States (OAS), sponsoring institution of the TIAR, was created in 1948 to promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. While both the Rio Treaty and the OAS are in effect at present-day, their relevance in high stakes politics in the region is arguable. The refusal of the United States to uphold the TIAR during the Malvinas/Falkland war, siding instead with its historic European ally, worked as an eye-opener for some Latin American elites. Henceforth, the membership of the United States in the OAS (and its location in Washington DC) has left many Latin American administrations unconvinced of the neutrality of the organization in resolving regional disputes. This skepticism intensified in the 2000s with the election of center-left governments across South America.

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), established in May 2008, can be seen as the skeleton of an autonomous South American governance structure, with defense and security issues grouped under the supervision of its South American Defense Council (SDC). The SDC project was launched by then Brazilian president Lula da Silva and his minister of defense, Nelson Jobim, during a state visit to Argentina in February 2008. The proposal gained impetus after the Colombian attack on a FARC guerrilla camp in Ecuador in March. Minister Jobim visited several South American countries to garner support, and the SDC was finally established in December 2008 (Weiffen, Wehner and Nolte 2013). Its founding treaty subordinates the organization to the principles and objectives established by the UN charter, the OAS charter and UNASUR’s decisions. Its main goals are to consolidate South America as a zone of peace, to create a common identity on defense matters and to strengthen regional defense cooperation. It should be emphasized that, ideological rhetoric notwithstanding, this does not entail a common defense policy, even less a military alliance (Amorim 2013). UNASUR was also part of Brazil’s strategy to use regional integration as a springboard for increasing its global influence. However, the Brazilian notion of the region have gradually changed from asset to burden in the last decade, as potential synergies lose steam and negative externalities raise. Currently, the major threat is the escalation of neighbors’ domestic conflicts that could result in the intervention of external actors – that is, the US. Thus, by institutionalizing security relations, Brazil intends to forestall ad hoc regional responses to crisis and extra-regional interventions (Spektor 2010).

Both MERCOSUR and UNASUR include democratic clauses through which member governments may intervene if a member state reverts back to authoritarianism. Intervention mechanisms range from partial and total suspension from the organization to the imposition of diplomatic sanctions. Procedurally, the two organizations allow high level consultations and direct presidential diplomacy among members. This became evident in 2012 when the then President of Paraguay Fernando Lugo was removed from office in a contentious move by the national congress. MERCOSUR and UNASUR served as fora within which President Dilma Rousseff could debate with her counterparts on how to proceed with the Paraguayan crisis. Finally, the decision was to invoke the democratic clauses, resulting in the temporary suspension of Paraguay from the two organizations. As Stuenkel (2013) remarks, this approach “is less likely to stir up anti-Brazilian sentiment at home or abroad. Only when preventive measures fail do Brazilian policy makers contemplate more invasive interventions.” Indeed, in 2009, an attempt to reinstate ousted Honduran president Manuel Zelaya had ended in failure without bringing Brazil significant gains in reputation.
South American organizations are virtually costless, as their headquarters are funded by the respective host countries, each member state pays for its own travel expenses, and common budgets are nonexistent (as in UNASUR) or negligible (as in MERCOSUR). However useful these organizations might be to Brazil’s power ambitions, they are fully intergovernmental. They lack supranational procedures because national sovereignty remains the utmost principle and organizing rule. Regional integration thus remains superficial rather than deep, and it would be more accurate to call it regional cooperation. Intergovernmental institutions offer a different set of incentives and resources for member states seeking to influence neighbors’ policies, among which presidential diplomacy stands out. Informal involvement, or shuttle diplomacy, has also been used by successive Brazilian governments whether in the frame of regional organizations or through bilateral or multilateral operations. In the last decade, the special advisor for international affairs to the presidential office, Marco Aurelio Garcia, carried out a discreet but nonetheless public role in contributing to restore domestic stability in troubled neighbors – especially Bolivia and Venezuela – and to prevent the escalation of third party inter-state conflicts.

**Prevention: Elimination of root causes of conflict, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation**

Policies of prevention capture the efforts to prevent conflict by building or sustaining domestic, regional and international institutions, which will contribute to the mitigation of international anarchy. Hegemonic stability theory contends that prevention policies are the mark of any state with significant leadership ambitions, as a key feature of a hegemon is that it subordinates its short term interests to the long term interests of the inter-state system it helps support, be it regional or global (Griffiths 2002). In order to achieve this, the hegemon needs to minimize or avoid altogether potential crises. Pivotal states with regional and global ambitions, like Brazil, are best served by devoting resources to threat prevention at home and abroad. Over time, Brazil has increased its investment especially in two areas, environmental activism and non nuclear proliferation, where the government most likely sees the greatest potential for international recognition.

Since the 1990s, Brazil has become a modest provider of development cooperation. This is due to both growing capacity – higher per capita income – and rising ambition – “as a means of seeking recognition and support for its global position and for initiatives like its lobbying efforts for United Nations reform and a permanent seat in the UN Security Council” (John de Sousa 2010).” Cooperation partnerships include South American as well as Caribbean and African countries, showing that Brazil’s aims reach beyond the region – or else conceive its region as encompassing the Caribbean and South Atlantic coastline states.

On the other end of development cooperation, Brazil is not a mayor recipient. Typically, extreme poverty, geopolitical prominence, and close ties with the world’s top donors determine whether a developing country becomes a recipient of foreign aid or not. The World Bank reports that in 2011, Brazil received $4 of net Official Development Assistance (ODA) per capita, close to Mexico’s $8, India’s $3, and Indonesia’s $2 ODA per capita for the same year (China’s ODA per capita comes out to $0 for 2011). On the other hand, ODA per capita for South Africa was $28; Turkey, $44; Bolivia, $71; and Ghana, $73.

However, there is one policy area – environmentalism – where Brazil’s vulnerability and salience among natural resource-rich countries has made it one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in the world. In particular, Brazil’s Amazon rainforest has made the country a focal point for environmental NGOs, local governments, and international donors alike (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). In fact, during the 1980s, Brazil was the top recipient of foreign environmental aid, and the following decade the country was surpassed only by China and India (Hicks et al 2010). Its main donors were the World

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2 See [http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS) for full technical definition and ODA per capita for all recipients in recent years.
Bank, the IADB, and OECD countries, especially West Germany, Japan, and Canada. More recently, Brazil increased its participation in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant program. The GEF partially funds environmental projects at the national, regional, and global level. Brazil is the Latin American country that has been awarded the highest number of GEF grants, 88, followed by Mexico with a total of 79.3

Since the approval of its first GEF-funded project in 1991, Brazil has participated in 21 global projects, making it one of the countries with the greatest inter-regional projection in the GEF project network. Figures 4 and 5 reveal the prominence of Brazil not only in the Latin American green network but also in the Asian and African ones.4 Countries are represented by the network nodes, and the ties between them (whether they participated together in an environmental project) are represented by the edges. Figure 4 uses a force-directed algorithm to map the proximity of countries by their level of collaboration in GEF projects. Figure 5 shows how Brazil is strategically located at the intersection of all environmental regional networks, which confirms our expectation that it uses these international networks as a soft power strategy. Somehow surprisingly, Brazil’s region shows less priority, and more interestingly, the four MERCOSUR members do not appear closer to Brazil than other Latin American and several extra-regional countries. This might be explained by a dual strategy: on the one hand, Brazil seeks to have greater international presence and thus go beyond its natural area of influence. On the other, Brazilian bureaucrats attempt to leverage their ties with foreign peers to access international resources (technology, best practices, and know-how) in order to compensate for deficits at home. Below, we will see that this strategy is also carried out in other policy areas of prevention and protection, such as nuclear energy, science and technology, and HIV/AIDS.

3 See http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_projects.
4 These networks graphs are created by using all regional and global project data from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) from 1991 to the present. See http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_projects_funding
Figure 4: Collaboration Network, Thinned by High (Frequent) Collaborators in Global Environment Facility Projects

Network of collaboration of GEF projects. Fruchterman-Reingold layout on a thinned affiliation matrix with threshold $\frac{n\text{-}t_{ies}}{3}$. Size of the node describes level of dependency on GEF funding to implement the environmental proposal.
Regarding arms (conventional and non-conventional) control initiatives, Brazil – as an advanced nuclear energy state – has had a significant presence in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (NPR) since its origin in the late 1950s. In fact, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957, Brazil secured a coveted seat at its Board of Governors by striking a deal with Argentina to alternate the position on a yearly basis – even though the governorship was limited to one state per (developing) region (Alcañiz 2000). In the 1960s, when the United Nations created the Committee on Disarmament in order to draft an international agreement to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Brazil was one of its eighteen members. During the 1970s, Brazil made considerable advances in nuclear energy development, aided by a major commercial partnership with West Germany. Despite its high profile in nonproliferation affairs, the country maintained a strained relationship with the Western leaders of the NPR (the US and its European allies) due to its rejection of a double standard in the 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), whereby nuclear weapons states remained armed and only the non-nuclear weapons states committed to disarmament.5

Again in this policy area, we see Brazil leveraging international ties and access to supplement domestic deficits as well as trying to deploy soft power in Latin America. If environmental networks locate Brazil as an inter-regional rather than a regional node, nuclear networks relocate it at the center of Latin America (Alcañiz 2010). The country is an essential player in a regional network forged by cross-national Research and Development projects with diverse applications of nuclear science and technology, sponsored by IAEA.6 Figure 6 shows this clearly.7 The network graph, made using project

5 Until the late 1990s, Brazil maintained a “parallel” nuclear program that was not under international safeguards. Within this program, Brazilian scientists worked on achieving uranium enrichment technology – finally realized in 1987 – and developing a nuclear submarine, still an unfulfilled goal (Alcañiz 2000).
7 Figure 6 was plotted using the SNA package in R 2.6, with a matrix of probabilities and distances estimated via multidimensional scaling (MDS). The MDS option takes as input a matrix of similarities and finds a “set of points in k-
data from IAEA, represents the cooperation patterns of twenty Latin American countries in nonmilitary nuclear power over a twenty year period. Similar to the environmental projects in Figures 4 and 5, these nuclear projects are initiated, adopted, and implemented by participating countries. However, the two networks offer some contrasts as well. In the environmental networks, Brazil appears more globally-oriented and less focused on building regional partnerships. In addition, the country’s status, given by its centrality coefficient, is much higher than all other Latin American countries (including the larger ones). On the other hand, its participation in nonmilitary nuclear cooperation is clearly regionally-oriented but not as prominent, as Argentina and Mexico share with Brazil high status.

**Figure 6: Network of Nuclear Collaboration of Latin American Countries, 1984-2004**
(Multidimensional Scaling Estimates)

Only very recently has Brazil attempted to take on the role of international mediator beyond its home region. The clearest evidence that Brazil is committed to extending its global reach through the use of soft power can be found in its 2010 mediation in the Iranian nuclear crisis. President Lula, together with his Turkish peer, negotiated an agreement with the government in Teheran to cease production of enriched uranium, a necessary (although not sufficient) step in the development of a nuclear bomb. Despite strong US opposition, Brazil managed to secure an agreement whereby Iran committed to

(Contd.)

dimensional space such that the Euclidean distances among these points corresponds as closely as possible to the input proximities” (Borgatti *et al.*, 2002).
outsourcing to France and Russia the enrichment of uranium for use in nuclear medicine. In the end, however, the gamble did not pay off as the Obama administration boycotted the agreement. The Lula government conceivably miscalculated Washington’s intense preference to manage any Iranian “solution” by itself.

Protection: Terrorism, organized crime and pandemics

Policies of protection describe traditional functions to protect society from external threats. Given its geopolitical location, Brazil has faced few terrorism challenges as from the early 1980s. The biggest international security concern for the country and its MERCOSUR partners is the tri-border among Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. This area has been identified by the United States as a possible point of entry of international terrorism, given its lax security and the suspicion (combined with muddled evidence) of activity by some Islamic groups. However, Brasilia has remained somewhat unpersuaded that the country has a potential terrorist problem, expressing serious reservations and criticisms toward the Bush Administration (2002-2008) “War on Terror” program, as revealed by diplomatic cables uncovered by WikiLeaks.

Brazil’s investment in anti-crime policies, on the other hand, is much greater given that public safety is a growing priority, especially in light of the two major international events that the country is hosting in 2014 – the World Cup – and 2016 – the Summer Olympics. Mainly, the Ministry of Justice, the Police, and the National Secretariat of Public Safety are in charge of fighting crime. In recent years, spending on public safety (including both discretionary and mandatory funds) has gone up significantly. In 2012 it was approximately R$ 8 billion (=US$ 3.3 billion) when only five years earlier, in 2007, total expenditures for public safety were R$ 4.5 billion (=US$ 2.69). The greatest increase of the budget is driven by personnel hires, about R$ 1.5 billion between 2007 and 2012. In addition, a special agency created in 2011 for planning and managing great public events (the Secretaria Extraordinária de Segurança para Grandes Eventos or SESGE) was given a yearly budget of R$ 717 (=US$ 301 million).

However, it should be noted, that it is precisely in dealing with violent crime that the Brazilian state gets the worst marks on human rights and civil liberties. The 2013 World Report by Human Rights Watch stated: “Torture is a chronic problem throughout Brazil’s detention centers and police stations. The United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment visited penitentiary and police institutions in the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, and Goiás in September 2011 and reported receiving ‘repeated and consistent’ accounts from inmates of beatings and other allegations of ill-treatment during police custody such as the obligation to sleep in unsanitary cells without proper access to water and food.”

Regarding pandemic protection, a recent report on the country by the World Health Organization states that: “Brazil participates actively in South-South Cooperation initiatives with several of its bordering countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela) for the control of endemic diseases such as malaria, schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis, Hansen’s disease and for the prevention of AIDS. There is also an intense exchange with MERCOSUR countries to establish common sanitary regulations, as well as with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in different areas.”

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8 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8662536.stm
9 See http://www.funag.gov.br/biblioteca/dmdocuments/Terrorismo_internacional.pdf
12 See http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_bra_en.pdf p. 36.

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Brazil seeks to increase its international presence, especially in the region and among other emerging economies, by participating in transgovernmental cooperative networks. Furthermore, transgovernmentalism allows coordination and the sharing of information, crucial activities in building prevention against a possible pandemic.

Precisely, Brazil is a global leader in the fight against the AIDS pandemic. With the largest number of HIV/AIDS patients in the Region, the country was forced to deal with the disease early, but it was only in the early to mid-1990s that the government adopted a national AIDS policy. The central pillar of this policy is the free and universal distribution of antiretroviral treatment by the state to all HIV/AIDS patients in the country. The supply of treatment and care accounts for approximately 70% of Brazil’s billion dollar budget for HIV/AIDS. A two-fold investment guarantees this supply. Domestically, Brazil has implemented a gradual Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) strategy in the manufacturing of antiretroviral drugs (Galvão 2002). That is, to lower costs and dependence on multinational pharmaceuticals, the country produces anti-AIDS at home.

Because of its domestic production, Brazil has challenged the patent claims of foreign pharmaceuticals. A high-profile dispute with the United States on the matter was resolved in part by Brazil’s appeal to the compulsory licensing clause in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIP). But the country has also pushed for a radical change in how governments conceive of protecting their citizens against the AIDS pandemic. The Brazilian government has taken up the cause of patient advocacy organizations and argued that the problem of access to treatment should be framed as a human rights issue. In 2001, Brazil’s position was crystallized by the United Nations Human Rights Committee “establishing access to medical drugs during pandemics – such as HIV/AIDS – as a basic human right” (Galvão 2002: 1864). To succeed in its international strategy, which in this policy area entails going beyond Latin America, Brazil once more has forged key transgovernmental ties based on commercial opportunity and like-mindedness.

Compellence: Display of military force to manage regional conflicts

Policies of compellence refer to the task of conflict resolution, particularly peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Since Brazil’s quest for regional influence and global protagonism has traditionally been conducted through diplomatic methods, this type of intervention has been rare. Although the country has sometimes deployed tougher means to pursue its goals, since 1870 it has always stopped short of military action. Its commitment to non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries has only recently undergone a slight revision, when Brazil needed to legitimize its acceptance to head the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) that was established in 2004. The administration wittingly engaged in wordplay, claiming that its traditional doctrine of non interference was not incompatible with a strategy of non-indifference (Hirst 2007: 7). Brazil’s leading role in the MINUSTAH displayed its capacity to project power and signaled its will of adopting a more muscular foreign policy while working together with its regional partners. However, the setbacks produced by the 2010 earthquake and ensuing reentrance of the US as effective manager of the relief and reconstruction operations tarnished the success of the Brazilian-led mission. This should come as no surprise when considering the country’s financial contribution: from 2004 through June 2012, Brazil’s
disbursements to MINUSTAH amounted to R$ 1,670 million (around us$ 700 million, i.e. much less than 0.01% of the GDP every year; see Brasil 2012: 163), not much for a would-be regional power.

The Haitian drawback was compounded by Brazil’s reluctance to even considering any kind of intervention in the Colombian conflict with narco-terrorist organizations. As the US maintained its economic and military assistance to the Colombian government, which ranks among the top five recipients of American foreign aid, Brazil’s reluctance to get involved in anything but low-risk scenarios raised further doubts about its capacity and commitment to enforce regional security.

To date, Brazil ranks 21 among all countries who contribute uniformed personnel to the United Nations peace-keeping missions. In 2013, Brasilia committed 1,509 units, of which virtually all went to MINUSTAH. The size of the contribution, rather small for a country as large as Brazil, can be explained by the absence of conflicts that require international peace enforcing mechanisms in its area of influence. In fact, many of the larger contributors ranking above Brazil happen to be much smaller countries, such as Ethiopia (6,609 units), Jordan (3,610), and Ghana (2,614) to mention a few, who have regional conflict at their borders. A second, but equally important reason for Brazil’s virtual irrelevance in missions that involve troop-deployment is its deep-rooted diplomatic tradition of non-interference and its attachment to the negotiated resolution of conflicts (Alsina Júnior 2009). With 2,166 units deployed abroad (mostly in Congo), tiny Uruguay outnumbers its giant neighbor and ranks 14 in the UN ranking.

Brazil’s unique participation in the MINUSTAH testifies not only to its risk aversion but also to the fuzziness of its home region. Indeed, Haiti was not a member of any of the regional organizations that Brasilia’s official documents acknowledged as crucial to its national strategy – such as MERCOSUR, UNASUR and the SDC. To bridge this gap, the preamble to the National Defense Policy, first enacted in 2005, was slightly amended after 2012 to include the Caribbean and Antarctica as part of Brazil’s strategic environment (Vaz 2013).

Assessment

Given the above discussion, it appears clear that Brazil runs short of the necessary capacities and consistent strategy to project its power to the region and beyond. The government oscillates between investing in region-building and pursuing global strategies, depending on the policy area and changing domestic preferences. Where possible, Brazil seeks to participate in established networks – either regional or global – in order to access resources and new markets. Multilateralism has been traditionally the preferred option, with minilateralism lately becoming a close second – and regionalism standing as one subset thereof. While bilateralism is seen as an exception or last resort, unilateralism is officially abhorred.

We have shown that Brazil’s behavior varies across the four dimensions of security governance. It is proactive as regards assurance and prevention, mostly reactive as regards protection, and rather inactive – with a few marginal exceptions – as regards compellence. In all four dimensions, though, it has been a stingy contributor, whether its investment is measured by comparison with other contributors’ or as a proportion of national GDP. Brazil’s dominant strategies depend on two factors: risk and cost. As these factors grow, the country’s propensity to intervene abroad recedes. The redefinition of its home region – from the Americas through Latin America to South America – has pursued the goal of reducing both the risks and costs of Brazilian regional activism, while providing a platform from which to launch its more muscled – but still low-cost – international activism.

Brasilia’s preference for non coercive means, which is based on its soft power structure and non-interventionist traditions, has biased the country’s role in regional security governance. It does no

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longer support US co-responsibility in South America, but it is not ready to assume the US previous role if hard power is required. On the contrary, it sustains the legitimacy of its regional role by contrasting it with historic American interventionism. Burden-sharing is thus asserted as more “democratic” and respectful of national sovereignty, though it becomes difficult to disguise that the burden Brazil is prepared to share is lower than what its neighbors deem necessary. Brazil can afford to be a reluctant regional power because its rise, “with all its tensions and dilemmas, does not take place in an international [regional] system but in an international [regional] society” (Merke 2013: 16), where concertación is accepted as the prevailing diplomatic practice. A midway institution between diplomacy and great power management, concertación is defined as a loose form of regional organization “based on consensus-seeking and peaceful settlement of disputes” (Merke 2013: 13). Since Brazil’s rise has been accompanied by a parallel emergence of other South American countries, its stand in the region has not changed as much as on the global scenario. Since the regional distribution of power has not varied greatly, neither have the mechanisms that manage inter-state relations.

Conclusions
As we have shown at the beginning, Brazil’s reluctance to a full-fledged commitment with its region is not new. Paraphrasing Andrew Hurrell, Spektor (2010: 192) argues that,

Looking at Brazilian foreign policy and Brazilian power in international relations from the perspective of the region remains ‘a study in ambivalence’... Even after several years of sustained economic growth and an expanding foreign-policy agenda, Brazil is not your typical regional power. It covers half the territory, population, and wealth of South America, and its military spending far surpasses that of its neighbours. Yet it has not sought to develop the capabilities to control these neighbours. It has sought to anchor and embed its power in a new network of regional institutions, and it has become the major institution builder in the region, but the institutional architecture that results is thin and weak (to a significant extent because Brazil pushes in that direction). Its governing elites are wedded to traditional understandings of national autonomy and do not consider pooling regional sovereignties into supranational bodies. They are equally reluctant to pay the costs of regional prominence, preferring to deal with smaller neighbours on an individual, ad hoc basis. For all its power, Brazil has not pushed smaller neighbours into complying with the new, increasingly institutionalized rules of the regional game.

Brazil’s definition of its home region is adjustable: it is “South America” when it needs to secure a manageable area beyond the US economic and security perimeter; but it may turn to “Latin America” when bidding for a position at an international organization. Such Janus-like strategy has placed the country simultaneously on several stages and obliges it to articulate diverse, sometimes even opposing views and interests. This qualifies Brazil as a cusp state, i.e. one that lies on the edge of and in an ambivalent relationship with regions that are seen to function as an international relations sub-system (Robbins and Herzog forthcoming) – only that, in this case, it straddles a fuzzy region and the global stage.

The fuzziness of the region stems not from any objective nebulosity regarding the contiguous area, but from Brazil’s deliberate decision to redraw boundaries according to its varying interests. Remarkably, Brazil’s second source of international identity does not stem from another regional grouping but from its self-identity as a global power (Malamud and Rodriguez 2013). From this perspective, the region has become increasingly burdensome, so foreign policy has adapted in order not to let the neighbors drain resources that the country needs for national development and global projection. Autonomy and development rather than security have been the Brazilian foreign priorities over the twentieth century, and they still are in the twenty first. With the appropriate adaptations, this strategy does not reveal “a Brazil-style exceptionalism [but] a long standing diplomatic culture that has so much characterized South America” (Merke 2013: 18).
In sum, Brazil’s low, late and soft investment in regional security governance is explained by a combination of low regional threats, insufficient national capabilities, a legalistic culture of dispute settlement, and the participation in transgovernmental networks that substitute for, or subtly underpin, interstate cooperation and regional institutions. Therefore, if the region continues to neither pose a threat nor stand as an asset, it should not be expected that Brazil upgrade its investment in regional security governance – diplomatic rhetoric and official treaties notwithstanding.
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